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Tax Opinions

(continued from page 71)

also sought the interest they were
required to pay on the back taxes.
The two actions were combined for
consideration by the Supreme
Court, New York County.
Supreme Court, New York County
The lower court dismissed the
claims of Alpert and Wolfman for
back taxes but allowed recovery of
the interest paid on the deficient
taxes. Further, the court allowed
the investors to amend their complaints to assert an additional
claim of breach of fiduciary duty
but denied them leave to amend
their complaints to include an additional cause of action in fraud.
Supreme Court, Appellate
Division
On appeal, the court first rejected the damage claims of Alpert and
Wolfman for back taxes. The court
stated that the recovery of damages
for fraud is limited to that which is
necessary to restore a party to the
position occupied before commission of the fraud. The court noted
that the victim of fraud may not
recover the benefit of an alternative agreement overlooked in favor
of the fraudulent one. Therefore,
the court denied Alpert and Wolfson recovery of back taxes in this
case because such recovery would
place the investors in a far better
position than had they never invested in Logan.
Additionally, the court denied
Alpert and Wolfman leave to
amend their complaints to assert
an additional cause of action in
fraud against the Esanu firm which
had structured Logan. The original
complaint alleged only that the
Esanu firm's opinion was knowingly false, while the proposed amended complaint alleged that the facts
in the Logan offering memorandum were false. The court denied
leave to amend because the original complaint did not give the
proper notice necessary to enable
the Esanu firm to prepare a defense
since the complaint did not sufficiently state the circumstances surrounding the amended fraud
claim. In addition, such an amend72

ment would require supplemental
discovery that would result in prejudicial delay of the case. Therefore, the court denied leave to
amend to include a second cause of
action in fraud.
As to the issue of recovery of
interest paid on the deficient taxes,
the court held that recovery of
interest must be denied. The court
cited a case in which the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit found that a defrauded investor in a coal mine tax
shelter was not allowed to recover
interest paid to the I.R.S. upon
disallowance of tax deductions.
That court reasoned that such interest did not constitute damages
suffered by the investor but rather
was a payment to the I.R.S. for the
investor's use of the money during
the period when he was not entitled to it. The New York court
adopted the reasoning of the Second Circuit. The court also reasoned that it was more equitable to
bar recovery of interest rather than
to allow the investors the windfall
of both having used the tax monies
for seven years and recovering all
interest thereon.
Lastly, the court denied leave to
amend the complaints to include
assertions of breach of fiduciary
duty because there was no support
for the conclusion that such a
fiduciary relationship existed between Alpert and Wolfman and the
Esanu firm and Shea Gould in the
absence of a contractual relationship between the parties. The court
used a three-prong test to determine whether professionals, such
as the defendant law firms, would
be liable for negligence for inaccurate reports. Under the test, (1) the
professional must have been aware
that the reports were to be used for
a particular purpose, (2) there must
have been a known party who
intended to rely on the reports for
furtherance of a purpose, and (3)
there must have been some conduct on the part of the professional
evidencing his knowledge of the
other party's reliance on the report.
In this case, the court held that
Alpert and Wolfman failed to satisfy the test because there was no
evidence that the Esanu firm and
Shea Gould were aware that the
potential investors would rely on

their tax opinion letters or that
Alpert and Wolfson, in particular
would. The class of potential investors was neither fixed nor identifiable.
Astrid E. Ellis

Imposing Penal
Sanctions For Breach Of
Home Improvement
Contract, In The
Absence of Fraud, Is
Involuntary Servitude
In State v. Brownson, 459
N.W.2d 877 (Wis. App. 1990), the
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
held that the state, absent some
indicia of fraud or misrepresentation, may not impose penal sanctions for breach of a labor contract.
The court held that doing so constitutes the type of involuntary servitude prohibited by the United
States and Wisconsin Constitutions. The court also held that
challenges to a statute based upon
the "overbreadth doctrine" must
be linked to a first amendment
claim, and that the state, in criminal proceedings, need not prove
intent unless it is a statutorily
required element of the crime alleged.
Background
James Brown ("Brown") asked
William Brownson ("Brownson")
to build a garage. Brownson was
the general manager of Professional Workers Construction
("PWC"). In a written home improvement contract, the two men
agreed that Brownson, through
PWC, would build the garage for
$5,525.00. Brown made a down
payment of twenty percent of the
garage's total cost and additional
payments of $3,315.00 and
$826.80. Brownson never completed the garage. One unpaid materialman filed notice of intent to file
a lien.
In May 1990, the Circuit Court
of Outagamie County, Wisconsin
convicted Brownson of violating
three provisions of the Wisconsin
Administrative Code: (1) § Ag
110.05(2)(d), failure to include the
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start and finish dates in a written
home improvement contract; (2) §
Ag 11 0.02(6)(m), failure to furnish
proper lien waivers; and (3) § Ag
110.05(9), failure to comply with
the terms of a home improvement
contract. The court assessed separate criminal penalties against
Brownson for each offense. Brownson appealed.
The Parties' Arguments on Appeal
Brownson argued that imposing
criminal penalties against him for
the breach of a labor contract, in
the absence of evidence of fraudulent intent, constituted involuntary
servitude in violation of the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions. He also argued that § Ag
110's definition of "seller" was
vague and overly broad and was
therefore unconstitutional. Finally, Brownson alleged a violation of
his due process rights based upon
the fact that the state was not
required to prove the element of
intent in his criminal prosecution.
He argued that wholly passive activity, without any proof of intent,
could not form the basis of a crime.
The State, on the other hand,
argued that finding for Brownson
would leave the public unprotected
from the unscrupulous practices
employed by some builders. The
State noted that statutes criminalizing the breach of a labor contract,
previously struck down by the
United States Supreme Court,
were statutes whose real purpose
was to force poor southern black
workers into peonage. The State
argued that § Ag 110.05(9) was
immune to constitutional challenge absent evidence of similar
malicious intent on the part of the
Wisconsin legislature.
The Court of Appeals' Decision
The court agreed with Brownson
that imposing penal sanctions for
the breach of a labor contract, in
the absence of any indicia of fraud
or misrepresentation, constituted
involuntary servitude in violation
of the Wisconsin and United States
Constitutions. According to the
court, the thirteenth amendment
prohibited involuntary servitude
enforced by the use or threatened
use of physical or legal coercion;
the threat of a criminal penalty for
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breach of a labor contract amounted to just such coercion. The United States and Wisconsin Constitutions permitted involuntary
servitude only as a punishment for
a crime or in certain "exceptional"
cases such as those relating to
compelled jury or military duty or
those relating to parent-child relationships. Because Brownson's
case did not fall within any of the
"exceptional" categories, the court
vacated Brownson's conviction for
failure to comply with the terms of
a home improvement contract under § Ag 110.05(9).
In so holding, the Wisconsin
court accepted the reasoning of an
earlier decision in the New York
Court of Appeals which had, after
interpreting previous United
States Supreme Court decisions,
struck down a statute imposing
penal sanctions for the breach of a
labor contract. In People v. Lavender, 48 N.Y.2d 334, 422 N.Y.S.2d
924, 398 N.E.2d 530 (1979), the
court found that the state has the
right to punish fraud. However,
because the fraud was perpetrated
by means of a labor contract, it was
a unique kind of fraud. This special
nature required conformity with
the statutory and constitutional
provisions which prohibited the
state from making failure to work
in discharge of a debt any part of a
crime. The Wisconsin court of appeals agreed that the state may not
enforce involuntary servitude, directly or indirectly, even if it arose
out of a contract voluntarily entered. The state could only subject
Brownson to a judgment for
breach; it could not hold Brownson
criminally liable for his breach.
The overbreadth challenge to §
Ag 110's definition of a "seller"
failed because the court found that
Wisconsin and federal constitutional law required that overbreadth challenges be linked to
first amendment claims. Brownson
failed to raise a first amendment
issue. Therefore, Brownson could
not use the overbreadth doctrine.
The court stated that Brownson
could not rely upon purely hypothetical situations to overturn his
conviction.
Finally, Brownson's due process
challenge failed. The court found
that intent is not an element of a

crime unless required by statute. In
this case, neither § Ag 110.05(2)(d)
nor § Ag 110.02(6)(m) included
any intent requirement and thus
none need be proved. The court
held that Brownson was a "seller"
within the meaning of the statute,
that Wisconsin public policy mandated holding sellers to minimum
standards of behavior, and that
these standards must be backed by
criminal penalties in order to protect the innocent public. Also,
Brownson admitted that his conduct was not wholly passive and so
involved some degree of intent.
Therefore, Brownson's conviction
without proof of intent did not
violate his due process rights. Accordingly, the court upheld Brownson's convictions under § Ag
110.05(2)(d) for failure to include
start and finish dates in a written
home improvement contract and
under § Ag 110.02(6)(m) for failure
to furnish proper lien waivers.
The Court's Disposition
of the Case
The court of appeals remanded
the case with instructions that
Brownson's $70.00 fine and ninemonth jail sentence for breach of
the labor contract should be vacated. According to the court, to do
otherwise would amount to the
enforcement of involuntary servitude in violation of the thirteenth
amendment. The court also instructed that the trial court's order
of restitution and the remainder of
Brownson's sentence should not be
disturbed.
Stephen McKenna
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economy flattens, attracting the
consumer's dollar becomes more
important, and some dealers find
themselves crossing the line to attract customers," said Sally Saltzberg, deputy chief of the Illinois
attorney general's consumer division.
The FTC recently sent a letter to
automakers and their advertising
agencies warning that big fines and
other penalties would be imposed
if car advertising included misleading claims or deceptive demonstrations. The notice may show a shift
in policy at the FTC regarding its
posture toward advertising agencies. During the 1980s, the FTC
pursued enforcement actions only
against manufacturers.
The letter follows an admission
in late 1990 by the Swedish manufacturer Volvo that it faked a demonstration involving one of its cars.
The Volvo ad showed the giantwheeled truck "Bear Foot" crushing a line of cars leaving a Volvo
station wagon unscathed. But residents of Austin, Texas, who played
extras in the commercial, were
suspicious, and they called the
Texas attorney general's office. After an investigation, Texas Attorney General Jim Mattox charged
that the ads were misleading in
several ways, including that the
Volvo had been structurally reinforced with steel or lumber. "The
car-crushing competition was a
hoax and a sham," Mattox alleged
in a complaint filed against Volvo.
In a settlement with the attorney
general, Volvo agreed to pull the
advertisements and publicly announce the ads were phony, but the
company acknowledged no wrongdoing. "The feeling was that the ad
was done tongue-in-cheek so that
people might not take it seriously,"
said William Hoover, senior vice
president of marketing for Volvo.
"It was a dumb decision."
According to Jerry Cizek, executive director of the Chicago Automobile Trade Association, which
represents over 700 new-car retailers, dealers groups also are working
to halt deceptive ads. "We recog74

nize there's a problem, and we're
committed to correcting it as an
association," Cizek said. "We
don't want a few dealers spoiling it
for the rest." Cizek said he is
working to stop "asterisk" ads
which often tout an unrealistically
low price for a car which may be
doubled by add-on charges listed in
the fine print.

Postal Rate Increases Limit
Junkmail
While consumers may cheer an
indirect benefit of the recent postal
rate increase in the form of less
"junk mail," magazine publishers
and direct-mail advertisers are
looking for ways to save their industry. The rise in rates has hit the
industry hard with a twenty-two
percent increase for second-class
mail (magazines and newspapers)
and a twenty-five to forty-one percent increase for third-class mail
(catalogues, commercial, nonprofit, and magazine subscription solicitation). "Coupled with the 18
percent increase that we had in
1988, our costs have gone up 40
percent in a three-year period,"
said D. Claeys Bahrenburg, president and chief executive of Hearst
Magazines. "We are basically appalled by it."
Publishers and direct-marketers
are considering a number of alternatives to deal with the rate increase. Two direct-mail advocacy
groups, the Direct Marketing Association ("DMA") and the Third
Class Mail Association ("TCMA")
are considering challenging the
new rates in court. "If everything
ultimately is accepted the way it is
now, there may be lawsuits by one
or more parties, including
TCMA," said Gene Del Polito,
executive director of TCMA.
Direct-marketers and publishers
also plan to focus their solicitation
efforts by targeting interested consumers. According to George
Wiedmann, president of Grey Direct, the direct-marketing division
of Grey Advertising, the rate increase "is going to force directmarketers to rediscover mass media." Cable television, which is
already set to reach specific consumer groups, is the most likely
medium. Through the use of tollfree telephone numbers to get the

names and numbers of prospective
customers, direct marketers will
mail advertising and information
only to those who are most interested in their products.
Publishers and direct-marketers
also are considering alternative delivery systems to get their products
to consumers. One such private
enterprise, Alternate Postal Delivery of Grand Rapids, Michigan,
plans to expand into ninety-five
markets in four years. Phillip Miller, president of the company, estimated that publishers could save
fifteen to eighteen percent in delivery costs. According to Norman
Rosen, president of Time Warner's
alternative delivery division, Publishers Express, "Alternative delivery makes economic sense... mailers are so upset by the new rates
that those who were sitting on the
fence will now get involved in
alternative delivery."

ANNOUNCEMENT
New Committee

To Focus On
Consumer Protection

The Section of Antitrust
Law of the American Bar
Association recently created
a Consumer Protection Committee to focus on consumer
protection developments and
enforcement initiatives. State
and private enforcement activities and counseling issues
involving consumer fraud,
deceptive advertising and
marketing will be the principal interests of the Committee. The Committee's
membership includes state
and federal agency lawyers,
corporate counsel, and private practitioners involved in
advertising and consumer
protection matters.
If you wish to join the
Committee or if you want
further information about its
activities, contact the Com-

mittee Chair.
Ray V. Hartwell, III Esq.
Hunton & Williams
P.O. Box 1535

Richmond, Virginia 23212
(804) 788-8510
(804) 788-8218 (FAX)
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